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Paul Douglass 
San Jose State University 
Now, if some bold novelist, tearing aside the cleverly woven curtain of our 
conventional ego, shows us under this appearance of logic a fundamental 
absurdity. . . we commend him for having known us better than we knew 
ourselves. This is not the case, however. . . [for] he in his turn is only offering 
us its shadow: but he has arranged this shadow in such a way as to make us 
suspect the extraordinary and illogical nature of the object which projects it. 
   —Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will (133-34) 
The writerly text is a perpetual present, upon which no consequent language 
(which would inevitably make it past) can be superimposed; the writerly 
text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as 
function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular 
system. . . [and] the codes it mobilizes extend as far as the eye can reach. 
   —Roland Barthes, S/Z (5-6) 
Literary Modernism exhibits a drive toward theory that precedes its 
appearance. Indeed, serious literary endeavor after the emergence of French 
Naturalism seems burdened by the responsibility to comment on—ideally, to 
add to—the theory of literary art. The emergence of Symbolism, Imagism, 
Dadaism, Futurism, Vorticism, Surrealism, and their prolific and 
rambunctious descendants attests to the truth of Barth’s observation that 
“[O]ne characteristic preoccupation, among others, of modernists and 
protomodernists was the problematics, not only of language, but of the 
medium and processes of literature: a manifestation of their heightened 
authorial self-consciousness” (Friday Book 209; italics are Barth’s). For the self-
consciously modern writer, novelty and experimentation became obligatory 
elements of a theory-into-practice pattern codified in the modernist period. 
Bergsonian aesthetics have furnished a useful key to the way twentieth-
century writers posited and resolved aesthetic problems,1 and the continuities 
and disruptions implicit in the term “postmodern” can also be teased out and 
better perceived through a Bergsonian lens.2 That is due to a much-noted 
peculiarity of the movement called “Modernism.” It has passed into history, 
and yet the “modern era” has not ended, and perhaps cannot end until 
humanity ceases to believe it is living in a constantly modernizing present.  
Bergsonian aesthetics dictate that art must constantly reinvent itself, and 
modernist writers undertook this strenuous work, which is predicated upon 
the theory of a reader reading (Barthes’s writerly text)—of text in action—
enacted, acting out. Bergson brought together and consolidated ideas about art 
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and literature that focused upon the experience of the reader and the illusions 
of art. In Bergson’s thinking, the need to disrupt familiar pleasures coincides 
with a de-emphasis of, or more accurately, a lessening of interest in the 
authorial role—stated another way, the merging of authorship with readership 
in a “plural” text that evades definition and categorization—a text that evokes 
the flow of consciousness itself, protean and radically “open”—nothing less 
than the immediacy of existence, the present, which Bergson defines as 
perpetual novelty, or “simply what is being made” (Matter and Memory 193). 
Bergson’s thought proves a useful key to postmodern literary practice3 and not 
coincidentally a precursor of poststructuralist thought.  
Bergson and Modernist Aesthetics: A Brief 
Introduction 
It is often good to begin with irony, when available, and there is no lack 
here. First, there is the fact that the “heightened authorial self-consciousness” 
of which Barth speaks has led to the disintegration of conventional ideas of 
authorship. Another irony, where Bergson is concerned, lies in the swing of 
modern artists toward “theory-into-practice,” an inversion he deplored. “What 
is common today,” he commented in 1911, “is that theory precedes creation. . . 
yes, in everything: in the arts as in the sciences. . . . For the arts I would prefer 
genius, and you?” Pragmatically, he admits, “we have lost simplicity, it is 
necessary to replace it with something” (Maurice-Verne; trans. by and qtd. in 
Antliff 3). Bergson disliked art produced according to “a school or theory” 
(Antliff 185, n. 2). Yet he was charged with inaugurating “wild 
experimentalism,” as Jacques Maritain wrote disapprovingly in Bergsonian 
Philosophy (66), which led to the proliferation of theoretical ideas about art.  
Regardless of Bergson’s own disapproval of such heavily theorized 
movements as Cubism or Surrealism, his philosophy exercised a crucial 
influence upon the international upheaval in the arts occurring in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. Bergsonism celebrates artistic insight, and 
Bergsonian aesthetics assert that art can restore contact with an inner life from 
which “modern” populations are increasingly alienated. As William James 
wrote, reading Bergson was “like the breath of the morning and the song of 
the birds” (Pluralistic Universe 270), not only because Bergson’s prose was 
exhilarating, but because he opened doors to new vistas of artistic creation and 
enlightenment—a possible path back from the abyss of ennui in modern urban 
life.  
A great deal of work has now been done to expose the legacy of Bergsonian 
thought in the consciously modern literature of the early twentieth century, 
including The Waste Land and Four Quartets, Remembrance of Things Past, To the 
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Lighthouse and The Waves, Tropic of Capricorn, Of Time and the River, the novels 
of Cather, the poetry of Stevens and Frost, and the fiction of Kazantzakis. A 
survey of that work is not possible in the space afforded here.4 Suffice to say 
that Bergsonism is readily apparent in such prototypical modernist caveats as 
Pound’s 1934 demand to “Make It New,” and in Stevens’s instructions for a 
“Supreme Fiction”—it must be abstract, must change, and must give pleasure 
(Collected Poems 380ff.), or in Stevens’ later assertion that, “The imagination 
loses vitality as it ceases to adhere to what is real” (Necessary Angel 6). 
Bergson’s ideas about time, consciousness, memory, experience, and the 
universe were exciting to writers as diverse as Henry Miller and Wassily 
Kandinsky. His philosophical thought was synthetic, comprehensive, 
challenging, and controversial. For example, Bergson was regularly attacked 
as an anti-intellectual. He apparently made many people uncomfortable 
because he wrote in a non-philosophical, literary style and achieved a 
remarkable popularity that at times embarrassed him.5 
That popularity was partly due to the visionary aspect of his thought. 
Bergson’s philosophy begins with a sort of cosmic revolt. He subscribed to the 
Big Bang model that is now the prevailing theory for the origin of the universe, 
and his poetics stem from his general view of the universe as a tumultuous 
creative action, and of human beings as creators: “For a conscious being, to 
exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself 
endlessly” (Creative Evolution 7). Bergson’s conception of life as a process of 
rebirth animated writers, musicians, painters, and sculptors. Kandinsky, 
Picasso, Brancusi, Metzinger, Gleizes, Matisse, and Fergusson were affected by 
Bergsonian thought, as Mark Antliff has established in Inventing Bergson. So 
were photographers like Alfred Stieglitz, and architects like Le Corbusier and 
Frank Lloyd Wright. Similarly, composers Erik Satie, Arnold Schoenberg and 
Paul Hindemith created works that embody a Bergsonian spirit of revolution 
and renewal. For example, we know that Schoenberg was reading Bergson as 
he worked on the beginnings of what became his dodecaphonic (twelve-tone) 
system of composition (Simms 71).  
Bergson’s universe may be self-creative, but it is also self-antagonistic. The 
energy of the “bang” (the élan vital, or vital impulse, in Bergson’s 
nomenclature), decays into static shapes. He likened the universe to the earth: 
solid on the surface, but molten inside, and subject to “sudden [volcanic] 
explosions whereby it suddenly resumes possession of its innermost nature” 
(Laughter 159). Bergson drew upon Spencer and Darwin to argue for a modest 
view of the intellect’s ability to grapple with the world’s plurality and chaos. 
In Bergson’s theory, the intellect evolved so the mind could cope with the 
“absolute originality and unforeseeability” of the élan vital (Creative Evolution 
29). To apprehend the world intellectually (rather than intuitively) means to 
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“immobilize” it (Matter and Memory 275), and if we accept the intellect’s 
version of “life,” then we enter a realm of “the discontinuous. . . the immobile. 
. . the dead” (Creative Evolution 165, Time and Free Will 237). To live only by the 
intellect means to become walking shadows of ourselves, “[h]arnessed, like 
yoked oxen, to a heavy task” (Creative Evolution 191). 
For Bergson, the appearance of a shadow self—called dédoublement, or 
doubling—is natural, inevitable. Most of the time we live “outside ourselves,” 
aware of our selfhood as “a colourless shadow which pure duration projects 
into homogeneous space.” Such a diminished life seems to unfold “in space 
rather than in time, [and] we live for the external world rather than for 
ourselves, we speak rather than think, we ‘are acted’ rather than act ourselves” 
(Time and Free Will 231). The function of art is to overcome the “parasitic self 
which continually encroaches” (Time and Free Will 172) and renew the intuition 
of inner life. Bergson believed intellect must be balanced by philosophical 
intuition (intuition philosophique), which is epitomized in the arts, particularly 
in literature (see Creative Evolution 191). So, for Bergson, alienation 
characterizes human life. The “living and concrete self” is constantly being 
“covered with an outer crust of clean-cut psychic states” (Time and Free Will 
167). The writer cannot change this fact, but by “dissolving or corroding the 
outer crust” of our lives, literature can “bring us back to the inner core,” 
restore the awareness of “real time,” and take us “back into our own presence” 
(Laughter 160; Time and Free Will 133-4).  
The daunting nature of this effort immediately becomes apparent, however, 
for language “can express the new only as a rearrangement of the old” 
(Creative Mind 94, 96): “Language, made for things, converts experiences into 
things” (Time and Free Will 130). Artistic intuition can renew language’s 
“signals,” making them “into instruments of art” only through subjecting 
them to extraordinary pressure (Time and Free Will 96). Poetry, for example, 
can rejuvenate dead and dying language by dislocating the reader’s 
consciousness: “[B]y rhythmical arrangement of words, which thus become 
organized and animated with a life of their own, [poets] tell us—or rather 
suggest—things that speech was not calculated to express” (Laughter 156). 
Bergson’s path for art is thus, above all, strenuous: “I repudiate facility,” he 
said. “I recommend a certain manner of thinking which courts difficulty. I 
value effort above everything” (CM 87). Introduction to Metaphysics described 
intuition philosophique as a method characterized by struggle: “The mind has to 
do violence to itself, has to reverse the direction of the operation by which it 
habitually thinks, has perpetually to revise, or rather to recast, all its 
categories” (Introduction to Metaphysics 51). 
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In fact, Bergson theorizes literature as essentially paradoxical and 
subversive. One image cannot evoke the flow of inner life (the durée réelle), but 
numerous images, taken “from very diverse orders of things, may, by the 
convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise point where 
there is a certain intuition to be seized” (Introduction to Metaphysics 16-17). The 
writer “insinuates” into the reader’s mind a perception of truth by “baffling” 
the reader’s thought processes (Laughter 155). Bergson’s aesthetics posit 
literary art as seducing the reader into a temporary self-realization, as 
dissonant images compete for one’s concentration, requiring “from the mind 
the same kind of attention, and in some sort the same degree of tension,” so 
that consciousness is drawn almost hypnotically “to appear to itself as it really 
is” (Introduction to Metaphysics 16-17). But does art actually break through to 
“reality”? Bergson acknowledges that this too is only an illusion—but so 
powerfully evoked that it stirs a memory in us of that inner life which is 
constantly being covered over by utilitarian forms. The “bold novelist” who 
tears aside our “conventional” selves and represents to us the “fundamental 
absurdity” of intellectual representations of life has also only shown us a 
“shadow.” But by arranging this shadow so that we “suspect the 
extraordinary and illogical nature of the object which projects it”—in other 
words, the unstoppable flow of inner life—he has “put aside for an instant the 
veil which we interposed between our consciousness and ourselves” (Time and 
Free Will 133-4). By such a subversion, writers go deep, and “delve yet deeper 
still,” groping after “the strains of our inner life’s unbroken melody” (Laughter 
156, 150).  
So, despite language’s limitations, Bergson thought literature was the 
epitome of the arts, which are a reflection of the original cosmic force that 
created the universe. Making literature is “toilsome,” but the process is 
actually “more precious even than the work which it produces,” because it 
means drawing “out from the self more than it had already” (Mind Energy 29). 
The jouissance of creation (Barthes’s bliss) echoes the Big Bang: “[J]oy always 
announces that life has succeeded, gained ground, conquered. . . . the richer 
the creation, the deeper the joy” (ibid.). Human beings’ first line of defense 
against the deadness of habituation is finally “language, which furnishes 
consciousness with an immaterial body in which to incarnate itself” (Creative 
Evolution 264-65). Reversing the metaphor, Bergson also compares “our whole 
psychical existence” to “a single sentence, continued since the first awakening 
of consciousness, interspersed with commas, but never broken by full stops” 
(Mind Energy 70).6  
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Modernism and Postmodernism: The Bergsonian 
Legacy 
The Bergsonian aesthetic legacy consists first in dynamic oppositions: the 
élan vital (the vital impulse) versus matter, durée réelle (the flow of real duration) 
versus clock time, habitual memory versus pure memory, dédoublement (the 
parasitic) versus the inner self. Bergson was a dualistic thinker in the Derridean 
mode, for whom concepts "generally go together in couples and represent two 
contraries" which cannot be resolved (Introduction to Metaphysics 39). From 
such irresolvable contradictions an art emerges based on metalepsis—broken 
chains of images or literary gestures that achieve strange and powerful 
compression. Above all, Bergson subscribed to the imperatives of constant re-
invention and authorial stealth and subversion. These principles and practices, 
so evident in modernist practice, are continued in the work of postmodern 
writers and thinkers. For example, Barthes’s and Foucault’s assertion of the 
author’s disappearance echoes Eliot’s idea of the impersonality of art, 
presented in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” or Stephen Dedalus’s 
suggestion in Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man that “The artist, like the God 
of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, 
invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails” (Joyce 
215). Modernist writers also wrote texts designed (like those of Barth and 
Pynchon in the 1960s and 1970s) to short-circuit conventional aesthetic 
transactions (nominally, “pleasures”) generated by narratives and poetic 
imagery in order to evoke a deeper pleasure (Barthes’s jouissance)—for 
example, The Waste Land, The Cantos, the first chapter of The Sound and the 
Fury. The postmodern concern with undecidability is also already at play in 
modernist works like The Waves, Finnegans Wake, and the first chapter of The 
Sound and the Fury. In these latter works, particularly, the writer subjects 
language to stresses that are metaleptic—almost metamorphic—demanding a 
different way of reading, a readerly openness to creativity that Bergson 
elucidated in his idea of the “vital impulse” and the joy of creation. 
To take one example from the list of oppositions just mentioned, in 
modernist works one finds numerous illustrations of the élan vital locked in 
endless war with material form. The Waves concludes with a vision of swelling 
force and sagging energy: “‘And in me too the wave rises. . . . I strike spurs 
into my horse. Against you I will fling myself, unvanquished and unyielding, 
O Death!’ The waves broke on the shore” (Woolf 297). In that passage Woolf 
echoes Creative Evolution, which describes “the whole of humanity, in space 
and time” as “one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each 
of us in an overwhelming charge” (Creative Evolution 27l). Frost also described 
the élan vital in conflict with matter in “West-running Brook” (1928), with its 
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“backward motion toward the source” (Frost 260). Tom Quirk argues that 
Willa Cather found her path as a novelist after reading Creative Evolution and 
taking up a belief in “the life impetus coursing through the living world” in 
constant conflict with its own materializing forms (126, 179). Similarly, Wallace 
Stevens made a major advance after a hiatus in his poetic efforts after reading 
Creative Evolution (Quirk 186). Stevens became more and more dedicated to the 
idea that poetry is the “spirit of visible and invisible change” (Opus Posthumous 
242), and that “[t]he mobile and the immobile” flicker “in the area between is 
and was,” and even that “the theory / Of poetry is the theory of life” (Collected 
Poems 474,486).7  
The image of life-energy (the “mobile”) as it endures an inevitable slump 
into sentience also appears in postmodern fiction. Vladimir Nabokov ‘s Lolita, 
for example, is filled with scenes and jokes based on mechanical or habituated 
responses drawn from a Bergsonian theory of life—a comedic technique based 
on the contrast between the fluidity of the living élan and the stubbornness of 
material forms. As Michael Glynn argues, Humbert Humbert “apprehends 
Lolita, Charlotte, and Valeria not as vital changing entities but as his creatures, 
as static objects who will act in conformity with his own preconceived 
notions” (111). In the crisis of the final pages, as Humbert finishes off Clare 
Quilty, he struggles with the reality of the gun, the room, the rug, the blood—
everything, seems alien and diminished: “I may have lost contact with reality 
for a second or two,” admits Humbert. The novel is one long delusional 
escapade haunted by the image of “Hourglass Lake,” in which Time has had 
its neck wrung by a mind as desperate to stop the relentless flow of durée as 
Quentin Compson’s in The Sound and the Fury. Humbert is intent on “fixing” 
things, refusing to grow or change, dwelling constantly in the past, so that his 
perceptions of the present are constantly warped and inaccurate. 
Late in life, Nabokov spoke in an interview included in Strong Opinions 
about the nature of durée réelle (the flow of real duration) versus clock time. His 
vocabulary is expressly Bergsonian: 
We can imagine all kinds of time, such as for example “applied time”—time 
applied to events, which we measure by means of clocks and calendars; but 
those types of time are inevitably tainted by our notion of space, spatial 
succession, stretches and sections of space. When we speak of the “passage 
of time,” we visualize an abstract river flowing through a generalized 
landscape. Applied time, measurable illusions of time, are useful for the 
purposes of historians or physicists, they do not interest me, and they did 
not interest my creature Van Veen in Part Four of my Ada. He and I in that 
book attempt to examine the essence of Time, not its lapse. Van mentions the 
possibility of being “an amateur of Time, an epicure of duration,” of being 
able to delight sensually in the texture of time, “in its stuff and spread, in the 
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fall of its folds, in the very impalpability of its grayish gauze, in the coolness 
of its continuum” (Strong Opinions 185). 
Nabokov was keenly aware that Time is all-too-human, known not through 
clocks, but in “the dim hollow between two rhythmic beats, the narrow and 
bottomless silence between the beats, not the beats themselves, which only 
embar Time. In this sense human life is not a pulsating heart but the missed 
heartbeat” (ibid.). Time outruns perception, giving rise to limitless tricks of 
illusion and delusion, as Nabokov’s narrators, from Humbert to Pnin and 
Kinbote, testify. 
Nabokov’s narrators, like Faulkner’s (Vardaman, Darl, Quentin, Jason) are 
mirrored in the azure produced by Barth’s and Pynchon’s protean tale-tellers, 
each of whom lives dédoublement—simultaneously true and parasitic. 
Pynchon’s narrators in V., The Crying of Lot 49 and Gravity’s Rainbow quest for 
their own pasts and personalities, driven by the imperative of constant, 
exhausting self-re-invention in the face of devolution and disintegration. 
Pynchon’s paranoia was part of a contagious outbreak following World War 
II, which was both the product and the cause of a continued feverish 
dismantling of literary form—in this case, the novel—in which I believe one 
can detect the continuing power of Bergson’s aesthetic challenge to art that it 
must perpetually reinvent itself. As Joseph Heller says:  
A general disintegration of belief took place [after WW II], and it affected 
Catch-22 in that the form of the novel became almost disintegrated. Catch-22 
was a collage; if not in structure, then in the ideology of the novel itself . . . . 
Without being aware of it, I was part of a near-movement in fiction. While I 
was writing Catch-22, J. P. Donleavy was writing The Ginger Man, Jack 
Kerouac was writing On the Road, Ken Kesey was writing One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest, Thomas Pynchon was writing V., and Kurt Vonnegut was 
writing Cat’s Cradle. I don’t think any one of us even knew any of the others. 
Certainly I didn’t know them. Whatever forces were at work shaping a 
trend in art were affecting not just me, but all of us. The feelings of 
helplessness and persecution in Catch-22 are very strong in Pynchon and in 
Cat’s Cradle. (“Reeling in Catch-22” ix-x) 
Whether it stemmed from an existentialist desperation in the post-WW II era, 
or is the product of a previously existing desperation that emerged in the 
aftermath of WW I, and simply never stopped occurring, may be debated—
but the idea of “experimental literature” rests solidly on a Bergsonian 
foundation, and resonates in the work of Alain Robbe-Grillet, Edmund White, 
Thomas Pynchon, Kurt Vonnegut, John Fowles, Italo Calvino, and (more 
recently) Anne Carson. 
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Novelty and Its Discontents: John Barth 
This burden of unending novelty created, as Umberto Eco saw it in the 
1980s, the predicament of modern authorship:  
I think of the postmodern attitude as that of a man who loves a very 
cultivated woman and knows that he cannot say to her “I love you madly,” 
because he knows that she knows (and that she knows he knows) that these 
words have already been written by Barbara Cartland. Still there is a 
solution. He can say “As Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly.” 
At this point, having avoided false innocence, having said clearly it is no 
longer possible to talk innocently, he will nevertheless say what he wanted 
to say to the woman: that he loves her in an age of lost innocence. (Postscript 
67-68)  
These themes of lost innocence, belatedness, and the recycling of language are 
found in abundance in John Barth’s works. For example, “Life-Story”—first 
published in Lost in the Funhouse (1963)—constructs a narrator unable to 
breathe life into his story, unable to capture a sense of “real life,” because the 
forms in which he is forced to cast this living material are themselves already 
dead, or begin to die as soon as he has employed them. In the first sentence he 
begins his story “afresh” (though without discarding what he has already 
written), and the story thereafter goes through a number of re-starts as he fails 
to satisfy himself: “Another story about a writer writing a story! Another 
regressus infinitum! Who doesn’t prefer art that at least overtly imitates 
something other than its own processes? That doesn’t continually proclaim 
‘Don’t forget I’m an artifice!’?” (117). “Life-Story,” like so many pieces in 
Funhouse, is haunted by the modernist charge to make fiction new despite an 
exhausted field of possibilities, to invent an artistic gesture that is not so 
disappointingly familiar to the reader that it is essentially “dead.” Ironically, 
this very struggle for freshness leads to clichéd, circular writing: “Why could 
he not begin his story afresh X wondered, for example with the words why 
could he not begin his story afresh et cetera? Y’s wife came into the study as he 
was about to throw out the baby with the bathwater” (119-20). All the drama 
here, as in other stories in Barth’s collection, like “Night Sea Journey,” 
“Autobiography: A Self-Recorded Fiction,” and “Anonymiad,” is derived 
from the struggle of life-writing, the endeavor to push words into life, 
dislocate their reality into something living and fluid, because “life is so sweet 
and painful and full of such a variety of people” (120). But though the narrator 
of “Life-Story” had thought his narrative would be “very long, longer than 
Proust’s. . . longer than The Thousand Nights and a Night,” he recognizes that it 
is a “short story” and that he (the narrator) is a fiction of his own making—a 
conundrum built on fantasies (having multiple mistresses, for example) that 
become identical with a “fictional” truth he projects almost as an emanation of 
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a true self he cannot effectively reach. In a concluding sequence that 
powerfully challenges the reader—”You, dogged, uninsultable, print-oriented 
bastard” (127)—Barth concludes by forcing us to confront what Bergson called 
“the extraordinary and illogical nature of the object” which has projected that 
life, leading us, strangely, “back into our own presence” (Time and Free Will 
133-4). As Barth writes, “What sort of a story is it whose drama lies always in 
the next frame out?” (Funhouse 121). The balancing and vanishing acts always 
flirt with the slump of life-embodied-in-literature toward death-embodied-in-
literature.  
Many further examples of Barth’s evocation of the illogical nature of the 
literary representation of time and identity may be culled from Funhouse. In 
“Anonymiad” the reader peers with Helen (a cow) into a pit to verify “that 
[the narrator] was trapped or dead,” only to be shocked by the narrator’s 
vigorous self-destructiveness (Funhouse 199). The comedy here is dark, 
mechanistic, based on the struggle of the living to surmount the vortex of dead 
habits and patterns of artistic creation. In “Title” the masquerade of literary 
process begins “Beginning.” In attempting to tell the “story of our life. . . [and] 
fill the blank,” the writer apparently achieves only a mediocre effect. 
“Conventional startling opener, comments the female character who has just 
been introduced: “‘Sorry if I’m interrupting the Progress of Literature,’ she 
said, in a tone that adjective clause suggesting good-humored irony but in fact 
defensively and imperfectly masking a taunt” (105). The text (and through it 
our pleasure) is disrupted by insertion of general markers in place of their 
artistic expression (“Title,” “Beginning,” “Plot and theme,” “adjective clause,” 
“gerundive,” “long participial phrase,” etc.), but always just at the limit of the 
reader’s tolerance for teasing: “I can’t finish anything; that is my final work. 
Yet it’s these interruptions that make it a story. Escalate the conflict further. 
Please let me start over” (107). It is all a mockery of “[h]ow sophisticated we 
are today,” allowing us to lament the fact that “[h]istoricity and self-
awareness. . . are always fatal to innocence and spontaneity” (110).  
The historicity that Barth suggests is always fatal to spontaneity is 
presented multiple times in Funhouse, particularly in “Anonymiad” and 
“Menelaid.” The latter story carries the concept of the frame-tale to absurd 
lengths. In the sixth section the narration has buried itself six levels, 
represented by quotations within quotations:  
“ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘ “How now!” Menelaus cried.’ I ditto,” et cetera. “ ‘ “Espouse? 
Espouse her? As lover? Advocate? Husband? Can’t you speak more plainly? 
Who am I?” 
“ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ” ’ ” ’ ” ’ ”  
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Working with buried cultural material—employing the “mythic method” that 
T.S. Eliot advocated after he read Joyce’s Ulysses—has its limits, and leads in 
this case to confusions about identity that aren’t just jokes. The emptiness 
between the punctuation marks constitutes both taunt and an invitation to fill 
in the blank. He cannot “speak more plainly,” given the cultural moment of 
the modern writer. 
Barth is perhaps like his narrator, “surfeited with clever irony,” so that the 
only invention possible is that of parody, the only novelty left a gesture of 
hopelessness, a caricature of failure, an “allegedly ultimate story” offered as “a 
form of artistic fill in the blank” (111). In Barth’s fiction, a metafictional 
confrontation is taking place. The writer confronts the limits of novelty and 
experimentation. As he expresses the narrator’s frustration, Barth never lets us 
forget the modern storyteller’s inescapable dilemma:  
Oh God comma I abhor self-consciousness. I despise what we have come to; 
I loathe our loathsome loathing, our place our time our situation, our 
loathsome art, this ditto necessary story. The blank of our lives. It’s about 
over. Let the dénouement be soon and unexpected, painless if possible, quick 
at least, above all soon. Now now! How in the world will it ever (113) 
The ending is broken off (open-ended?), the abhorrence endless, the invitation 
to the reader to fill in the “blank[s] of our lives” still open. But a primary 
lament remains the story’s burden: the impossibility of fresh narrative in an 
age of sophistication, the hopelessness of invention in a world where 
everything has already been invented, and the claustrophobia produced by the 
shrinking literary universe.  
These themes and this situation are only worth writing about if one has 
taken a Bergsonian perspective on literary aesthetics. The closer one looks at 
the practices of postmodern writers, the more explanatory become Bergsonian 
concepts in reading their works. 
Bergson and Poststructuralism: Deleuze, Derrida, 
Barthes 
That last claim cannot be satisfactorily shown here, I am aware. I have 
sought to expose some convincing presence of Bergsonian concepts in works 
of Barth and Nabokov, and allude to such concepts in the work of a few other 
writers. Let me conclude with some remarks on philosophical and aesthetic 
writings related to the literary moment of postmodernism, especially those of 
Gilles Deleuze, Frederic Jameson, Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes.  
Deleuze’s adaptation of Bergsonian concepts in his short study Bergsonism 
and his longer and highly detailed texts Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, extend 
Bergson’s project to represent the historical consciousness—the mind at work 
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connecting the present with the past in ever-changing, always-evolving 
patterns. For Deleuze, cinema is the medium in which the philosophy of a 
postmodern consciousness is both theorized and made real: “We must no 
longer ask ourselves, ‘What is cinema?’ but ‘What is philosophy?’” (Cinema 2 
280). Deleuze conceives the body as without “organs”—merely a part of a 
system of “cutting” and rationalization. That system is a Bergsonian one of 
tensions between closure and containment, quality and quantity. Film, as we 
have it from Deleuze, reveals the ultimately disembodied nature of experience. 
Film, despite Bergson’s critique of the early film-camera, embodies Bergson’s 
notion of the durée and re-orders our questions regarding the meaning of 
body-representations, both in the individual human consciousness, and in 
society at large; it makes time and subjectivity central to cultural activity. 
Deleuze thus highlights the Bergsonian oppositions between the élan vital and 
materiality, and between the durée réelle and intellectual representation. His 
notion of infinitely circulating desire is akin to Barthes’s writerly text, in that it 
constitutes an attempt to escape spatialized representations of life and enter 
into experienced, real time.  
Such a Bergsonian conflict seems to be central to writers of poststructural 
philosophy. As Berndt Clavier has argued, postmodernism “has been 
theorized primarily as a spatial and spatializing phenomenon, or more 
properly as that ‘spatialization of time’ which [William V.] Spanos already in 
1971 suggested defined postmodernism in the arts” (68).8 Frederic Jameson 
reinforces Clavier’s claim that postmodernity is essentially the product of 
spatialization, and that “space is what represses temporality and temporal 
figurality absolutely” (Jameson 62ff.). What seems to have been forgotten here 
is that in literature of the modernist era a confrontation between experienced 
time and spatialization had already occurred, and that modernism had already 
established that the self-conscious use of spatializing techniques can valorize 
and evoke time-as-experience through its absence. The idea of a presence 
evoking an absence is illustrated in the ways artists render dynamism through 
appallingly static characters and situations. To state this principle differently, 
experienced time is powerfully evoked through images of space. For example, 
Faulkner repeatedly offers imagery of stasis and resistance, intended to make 
the flow of time appear in our imaginations—as when he describes the birds in 
Light in August as hanging in “still-winged and tremulous suspension” (85-6). 
Sartre misapprehended Faulkner and complained that he had “decapitated 
time” because he had removed the possibility for "free choice and act" (230). 
But as I am arguing, the portrayal of “volitionless” characters, like Joe 
Christmas and Joanna Burden, leads the reader back to what is absent: time, 
flux, and freedom. A similar effect is achieved with excruciating discipline by 
Alain Robbe-Grillet in La jalousie, in which time is “stopped” by an emotionless 
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commentary, with the effect for the reader being quite the opposite—an 
enhanced awareness of emotionality and the unstoppability of time.9 
The literary technique of employing a stultifying stasis to evoke flux 
evolved in response to the problem of language’s origins and limits, and on 
this subject there are few philosophers whose ideas seem to anticipate 
poststructural thought as closely as Bergson. As Suzanne Guerlac says, 
Derrida took a perspective on language “very close to Bergson’s,” and she 
asserts the “proximity of Derrida’s notion of deconstruction as writing practice and 
Bergson’s keen analysis of the limits of language in the face of time” (185, 186). 
Daniel Alipaz has recently followed on this research path with an incisive 
essay on Bergson and Derrida. As Alipaz argues, Derrida “pushes language to 
the brink” in order to bring it into the sphere of the spiritual (l’esprit) (117). 
Alipaz further argues that Derrida’s concept of the future “is a constantly 
unfolding one, a movement that defies understanding at its very root, but 
simultaneously, like Bergsonian durée, is creative” (111-12). There is “an 
unquestionable overlap between their two discourses” (99), and Alipaz hopes 
that the “confluence between Bergson and Derrida will continue to revitalize 
Bergson’s often misunderstood dualisms in light of their development by key 
poststructural figures” (117). 
An example of this “confluence” can be found in Bergson’s critique of the 
idea of nothingness, which anticipates foundational concepts of deconstruction 
and poststructuralist literary theory, especially the “presence in absence” 
principle to which we have already alluded. Bergson wrote in Creative 
Evolution: “[T]here is more, and not less in the idea of an object conceived as “not 
existing” than in the idea of this same object conceived as “existing”; for the idea of the 
object “not existing” is necessarily the idea of the object “existing” with, in addition, 
the representation of an exclusion of this object by the actual reality taken in block” 
(Creative Evolution 286; Bergson’s italics). Bergson asserts that language escapes 
and then reorients the paths of philosophical inquiry, and in doing so, he 
seems to anticipate Derrida’s analysis of presence and absence, epitomized in 
his claim (to be echoed by Barthes) that “there is nothing outside the text” [il 
n’y a pas de hors-texte] (Derrida 143, 158). Derrida’s clever use of negation here 
echoes Creative Evolution’s fourth chapter.  
And just as there is a harmony between Derrida and Bergson, so there is a 
parallel between Bergson and Barthes. Barthes’s idea of the “writerly text” is 
bound up in the flow of time, “a perpetual present”: The writerly text is 
“ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) 
is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized.” Barthes imagines a text that has 
transcended stasis, maintaining its allegiance to the mobile, the flux of time, 
and to “plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of 
Barth, Barthes, and Bergson 47 
languages” (S/Z 5). He opposes such texts to “readerly texts” that are merely 
conventional productions of a culture, familiar patterns, and part of a closed 
system. In the perpetual present that is the writerly text, interpretation changes 
its nature and follows another path. As Barthes says, “To interpret a text is not 
to give it a (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the 
contrary to appreciate what plural constitutes it.” Such a text forms not a single 
world, but “a galaxy of signifiers. . . [that] has no beginning” (ibid.). Barthes 
admits that no text is invulnerable to being oversimplified by critical 
discourse, so “systems of meaning” can always assault and “take over this 
absolutely plural text,” but something in the plural (writerly) text always 
remains open, inviting the creative act. In claiming that the writerly text 
constitutes a “perpetual present” that remains perpetually “open” (in defiance 
of the language’s pragmatic tendencies), Barthes seems to state a Bergsonian 
view of literature, in which a writer must choose to be difficult, selecting 
disparate images, disparate expressions, which collide and coalesce, making a 
text that defies the intellect’s totalizing force and paternalistic control: 
The interpretation demanded by a specific text, in its plurality, is in no way 
liberal: it is not a question of conceding some meanings, of magnanimously 
acknowledging that each one has its share of truth; it is a question, against 
all in-difference, of asserting the very existence of plurality, which is not that 
of the true, the probable, or even the possible. This necessary assertion is 
difficult, however, for as nothing exists outside the text, there is never a 
whole of the text (which would by reversion form an internal order, a 
reconciliation of the complementary parts, under the paternal eye of the 
representative Model): the text must simultaneously be distinguished from 
its exterior and from its totality. All of which comes down to saying that for 
the plural text, there cannot be a narrative structure, a grammar, or a logic; 
thus, if one or another of these are sometimes permitted to come forward, it 
is in proportion (giving this expression its full quantitative value) as we are 
dealing with incompletely plural texts, texts whose plural is more or less 
parsimonious. (S/Z 6) 
To leave “structure” behind engenders a poststructuralist angst; for what will 
substitute for “structure”? For Barthes, something like Bergsonian “becoming” 
has become a textual “center.” The text is defined as our experience, and it 
tries to merge us into the fundamental flow of life, transcending language, 
defying grammar and logic and narrative structures, and distancing itself 
ironically from its own seriousness in order to sneak under readers’ defenses. 
In stating this principle—if I am correct—Barthes seems to validate Bergson’s 
continuing significance for the world of literary theory and for the modern 
artist, who must theorize, must incessantly forge writing anew, and must 
endure the modern era’s demand for ceaseless novelty and experimentation. 
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Notes 
1. The list of modernist writers who have already been deeply connected by scholarship to 
Bergsonian thought is long: Jacques Maritain, Nikos Kazantzakis, T. E. Hulme, John 
Middleton Murry, Julien Benda, Wyndham Lewis, T. S. Eliot, Willa Cather, Louis-Ferdinand 
Céline, Joseph Conrad, William Faulkner, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Robert Frost, Eugène Ionesco, 
James Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, Henry Miller, Marianne Moore, Vladimir Nabokov, Ezra 
Pound, Marcel Proust, John Crowe Ransom, Dorothy Richardson, Gertrude Stein, John 
Steinbeck, Wallace Stevens, Allen Tate, Robert Penn Warren, William Carlos Williams, 
Thomas Wolfe, Virginia Woolf. 
2. It is worth noting how intertwined the terms “modern” and “postmodern” have always 
been, that even in what Barth dubs the “proto-modern” period (the latter part of the 
nineteenth century), the term “postmodern” was already at play, as Ihab Hassan has shown. 
12-14. 
3. I am here defining “postmodern” as “resistance postmodernism,” in Hal Foster’s apt 
phrase from The Return of the Real, or in other words, a neo-avant garde movement as opposed 
to that postmodernism which Lyotard and Jameson define as complicit with capitalism. 
4. Some essential book-length studies include Mark Antliff’s Inventing Bergson (1992), Paul 
Douglass and Fred Burwick’s The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy 
(1992), Douglass’s Bergson, Eliot, and American Literature (1986), Tom Quirk’s Bergson and 
American Culture (1990), Rosa Slegers’ Courageous Vulnerability: Ethics and Knowledge in Proust, 
Bergson, Marcel, and James (2010), Mary Ann Gillies’ Henri Bergson and British Modernism (1996), 
and Michael Glynn’s Vladimir Nabokov: Bergsonian and Russian Formalist Influences in his Novels 
(2007). 
5. Bergson was forced to reserve seats at lectures for his students, since journalists, tourists, 
clergy, foreign students, and even ladies of fashion came to the hall at the Sorbonne. The 
philosopher faced a bewildering logjam of admirers bearing bouquets and gifts, through 
which he would have to push his way to the podium, on one occasion protesting, "But . . . I 
am not a dancer!" [“Mais. . . je ne suis pas une danseuse!”] The newspapers suggested he 
move his "performances" to the Paris Opera. See Mosse-Bastide 34. 
6. William James has aptly expressed this idea in the phrase, “stream of consciousness” 
(employed by him in 1890 in Principles of Psychology) which has been preferred by many critics 
of the past over Bergson’s complex of concepts (memory, élan vital, durée réelle). Bergson’s, 
however, are more productive for an understanding of modern and postmodern aesthetics. 
James was a proponent of Bergsonism, and agreed with the diminished role assigned by 
Bergson to the analytic powers of the intellect when used to understand the deep inner 
experience of time: “The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases is in fact like seizing a 
spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the 
darkness looks.” 236-37.  
7. See also Douglass, “The Theory of Poetry.” 245-60. 
8. Clavier alludes to Spanos 147-68. 
9. La jalousie begins: “Now the shadow of the column—the column which supports the 
southwest corner of the roof—divides the corresponding corner of the veranda into two equal 
parts.” 33. 
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